题名 | Specularizer : Detecting Speculative Execution Attacks via Performance Tracing |
作者 | |
通讯作者 | Zhang,Yinqian |
DOI | |
发表日期 | 2021
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会议名称 | 18th International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware and Vulnerability Assessment (DIMVA)
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ISSN | 0302-9743
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EISSN | 1611-3349
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会议录名称 | |
卷号 | 12756 LNCS
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页码 | 151-172
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会议日期 | JUL 14-16, 2021
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会议地点 | null,null,ELECTR NETWORK
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出版地 | GEWERBESTRASSE 11, CHAM, CH-6330, SWITZERLAND
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出版者 | |
摘要 | This paper presents Specularizer, a framework for uncovering speculative execution attacks using performance tracing features available in commodity processors. It is motivated by the practical difficulty of eradicating such vulnerabilities in the design of CPU hardware and operating systems and the principle of defense-in-depth. The key idea of Specularizer is the use of Hardware Performance Counters and Processor Trace to perform lightweight monitoring of production applications and the use of machine learning techniques for identifying the occurrence of the attacks during offline forensics analysis. Different from prior works that use performance counters to detect side-channel attacks, Specularizer monitors triggers of the critical paths of the speculative execution attacks, thus making the detection mechanisms robust to different choices of side channels used in the attacks. To evaluate Specularizer, we model all known types of exception-based and misprediction-based speculative execution attacks and automatically generate thousands of attack variants. Experimental results show that Specularizer yields superior detection accuracy and the online tracing of Specularizer incur reasonable overhead.;This paper presents Specularizer, a framework for uncovering speculative execution attacks using performance tracing features available in commodity processors. It is motivated by the practical difficulty of eradicating such vulnerabilities in the design of CPU hardware and operating systems and the principle of defense-in-depth. The key idea of Specularizer is the use of Hardware Performance Counters and Processor Trace to perform lightweight monitoring of production applications and the use of machine learning techniques for identifying the occurrence of the attacks during offline forensics analysis. Different from prior works that use performance counters to detect side-channel attacks, Specularizer monitors triggers of the critical paths of the speculative execution attacks, thus making the detection mechanisms robust to different choices of side channels used in the attacks. To evaluate Specularizer, we model all known types of exception-based and misprediction-based speculative execution attacks and automatically generate thousands of attack variants. Experimental results show that Specularizer yields superior detection accuracy and the online tracing of Specularizer incur reasonable overhead. |
学校署名 | 通讯
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语种 | 英语
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相关链接 | [Scopus记录] |
收录类别 | |
WOS研究方向 | Computer Science
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WOS类目 | Computer Science, Information Systems
; Computer Science, Theory & Methods
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WOS记录号 | WOS:000691572200008
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EI入藏号 | 20213310764559
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EI主题词 | Learning systems
; Malware
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EI分类号 | Computer Software, Data Handling and Applications:723
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Scopus记录号 | 2-s2.0-85112335490
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来源库 | Scopus
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引用统计 |
被引频次[WOS]:3
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成果类型 | 会议论文 |
条目标识符 | http://sustech.caswiz.com/handle/2SGJ60CL/243058 |
专题 | 南方科技大学 工学院_计算机科学与工程系 |
作者单位 | 1.The Ohio State University,Columbus,43210,United States 2.Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen,Guangdong,518055,China 3.NIO Security Research,San Jose,95134,United States |
通讯作者单位 | 南方科技大学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 |
Wang,Wubing,Chen,Guoxing,Cheng,Yueqiang,et al. Specularizer : Detecting Speculative Execution Attacks via Performance Tracing[C]. GEWERBESTRASSE 11, CHAM, CH-6330, SWITZERLAND:SPRINGER INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING AG,2021:151-172.
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条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 文献类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | 操作 | |
SPECULARIZER.pdf(1007KB) | -- | -- | 限制开放 | -- |
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