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题名

An Insurance-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing to Improve System Security

作者
通讯作者Zhao, Rong
DOI
发表日期
2018
ISBN
978-1-5386-1483-9
会议录名称
页码
377-383
会议日期
9-11 May 2018
会议地点
Nanjing, China
出版地
345 E 47TH ST, NEW YORK, NY 10017 USA
出版者
摘要
In a crowdsourcing system, security is a critical issue which affects the participation willingness of users. To motivate users' participation, most of existing work provide additional reward to compensate their loss due to security issues. However, more efficient way is to motivate the users to arm with higher security capability, to reduce the infection probability from the attackers and malicious software. In this paper, we propose an insurance-based incentive framework to motivate the users to upgrade to a higher security level. The framework can be formed as a Stackelberg game, where crowdsourcing platform is the leader and the users are followers. Through backward induction, we found that a Nash Equilibrium exists in the Stackelberg game. Simulation result shows that the proposed mechanism can enhance both social welfare, platform utility and users' utility in the crowdsourcing system.
关键词
学校署名
第一 ; 通讯
语种
英语
相关链接[来源记录]
收录类别
资助项目
Shenzhen Science, Technology and Innovation Commission Basic Research Project[JCYJ 20160531190935987]
WOS研究方向
Computer Science ; Engineering
WOS类目
Computer Science, Interdisciplinary Applications ; Computer Science, Theory & Methods ; Engineering, Electrical & Electronic
WOS记录号
WOS:000482133300066
EI入藏号
20184105918715
EI主题词
Interactive computer systems
EI分类号
Digital Computers and Systems:722.4
来源库
Web of Science
全文链接https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8465240
引用统计
被引频次[WOS]:0
成果类型会议论文
条目标识符http://sustech.caswiz.com/handle/2SGJ60CL/24665
专题工学院_计算机科学与工程系
作者单位
1.Southern Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
2.Nanyang Technol Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Singapore, Singapore
第一作者单位计算机科学与工程系
通讯作者单位计算机科学与工程系
第一作者的第一单位计算机科学与工程系
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Zhao, Rong,Jiang, Linshan,Zhang, Jin. An Insurance-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing to Improve System Security[C]. 345 E 47TH ST, NEW YORK, NY 10017 USA:IEEE,2018:377-383.
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