南方科技大学知识苑(SUSTech KC): 多车主博弈视角下的电动汽车交互式充放电策略研究

题名	多车主博弈视角下的电动汽车交互式充放电策略研究
其他题名	RESEARCH ON INTERACTIVE CHARGING AND DISCHARGING STRATEGY OF ELECTRIC VEHICLE UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF MULTI-OWNER GAME
姓名	李泽锴
姓名拼音	LI Zejie
学号	12032221
学位类型	硕士
学位专业	080902 电路与系统
学科门类/专业学位类别	08 工学
导师	蹇林旎
导师单位	电子与电气工程系
论文答辩日期	2023-05-16
论文提交日期	2023-06-29
学位授予单位	南方科技大学
学位授予地点	深圳
摘要	随着电动汽车的数量不断增多，大规模无序充电给电网带来的压力也不容忽视。车网能量互动（V2G）技术为电动汽车利用其电池能量实现灵活储能支撑电力系统，缓解电网压力提供了可能。而电动汽车交互式充放电（V2V）技术作为车网能量互动技术的一种补充，更有效地促进了电动汽车之间的交互，对于构建用户友好型电网，激发车主作为电能量交易主体具有重要意义。基于此，本文引入了博弈论作为理论基础，研究多车主博弈视角下的电动汽车交互式充放电策略。具体完成了如下工作：首先，针对现有研究中关于电动汽车参与电力市场的机制定义不明晰的问题，对电动汽车参与电力市场的机制进行了再思考。通过从市场角度对 V2G 和 V2V 这两种机制进行辨析，进一步明确了 V2V 机制的独特性。在此基础上，对电动汽车通过 V2V 机制参与电力市场进行了深入的分析并对其具体的实施方案进行了研究。其次，针对电动汽车充放电调度过程中车主充电紧急性与经济利益之间潜在的矛盾关系，提出了一种考虑车主充电紧急程度与价格适配性的电动汽车交互式充放电策略。在所设计的交互式充放电机制所需要遵循原则的基础上，规划了车主充电紧急程度和价格适配性的模型，并通过议价博弈理论在电动汽车交互式充放电策略中的应用完成了议价博弈问题的构建。算例结果表明所提策略使车主用电成本明显下降，确保车主参与的积极性。最后，针对电动汽车可灵活部署和分布式电力市场互动的潜能，提出了一种基于非合作博弈理论和优化模型的电动汽车交互式充放电策略。根据车主和充电场站的实际情况构建了优化模型，之后引入了非合作博弈理论并将该优化模型所对应的实际问题等价为电动汽车充放电决策的纳什均衡问题并结合信息物理架构设计了对应的均衡求解算法。算例结果表明所提策略与常规充电策略相比，显著降低了局部配电网的负荷方差的同时兼顾了车主用电需求的满足和成本的下降，同时所设计的算法有效地对电动汽车充放电决策的纳什均衡问题进行了求解并收敛到均衡值。
其他摘要	As the number of electric vehicles (EVs) continues to increase, the pressure brought to the power grid by large-scale uncoordinated charging cannot be ignored. Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) technology provides the possibility for EVs to use their battery energy to support the power system with flexible energy storage and alleviate the pressure on the power grid. Meanwhile, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) technology, as a supplement to V2G technology, more effectively promotes interaction between EVs. This is of great significance for building user-friendly power grids and inspiring vehicle owners as the main players in energy transactions. Based on this, this paper introduces game theory as a theoretical basis to study the strategy of interactive charging for EVs from a multi-owner game perspective. The specific work completed is as follows: In response to the unclear definition of the mechanism of electric vehicle participation in the electricity market in existing research, this study reconsiders the mechanisms of electric vehicle participating in the electricity market. By analyzing V2G and V2V mechanisms from a market perspective, the uniqueness of the V2V mechanism is further clarified. Based on this, this study conducts an in-depth analysis of electric vehicles participating in the electricity market through the V2V mechanism and explores specific implementation plans. In response to the potential conflict between the urgency of EV charging and economic benefits during the charging and discharging scheduling process, a V2V charging and discharging strategy for EVs is proposed that takes into account both the urgency of charging for the vehicle owner and the adaptability of pricing. Based on the principles of the designed interactive charging mechanism, a model is developed for the compatibility of charging urgency and pricing. Bargaining theory is applied to construct a bargaining problem in the V2V charging and discharging strategy. The case study results indicate that the proposed strategy can significantly reduce the electric cost of EVs owners and ensure their active participation in the interactive charging process. In response to the potential for flexible deployment of electric vehicles and interaction with distributed power markets, a non-cooperative game theory and optimization-based electric vehicle interactive charging strategy is proposed. An optimization model is constructed based on the actual situations of vehicle owners and charging stations. Then, non-cooperative game theory is introduced and the actual problem corresponding to the optimization model is equivalently solved as a Nash equilibrium problem of electric vehicle charging and discharging decisions. An equilibrium solution algorithm is designed based on the practical information physical architecture. The numerical results show that compared with conventional charging methods, the proposed strategy significantly reduces the load variance of local distribution networks while considering both the satisfaction of vehicle owner's electricity demand and cost reduction. Furthermore, the designed algorithm effectively solves the Nash equilibrium problem of electric vehicle charging and discharging decisions.
关键词	电动汽车交互式充放电策略 V2V 机制议价博弈非合作博弈
其他关键词	EV Interactive Charging And DisCharging Strategy V2V Mechanism Bargaining Non-cooperative Game
语种	中文
培养类别	独立培养
入学年份	2020
学位授予年份	2023-06
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所在学位评定分委会	电子科学与技术
国内图书分类号	TM73
来源库	人工提交
成果类型	学位论文
条目标识符	http://sustech.caswiz.com/handle/2SGJ60CL/544492
专题	工学院_电子与电气工程系
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	李泽锴. 多车主博弈视角下的电动汽车交互式充放电策略研究[D]. 深圳. 南方科技大学,2023.

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