南方科技大学知识苑(SUSTech KC): Security token offerings versus loan guarantees for risk-averse entrepreneurs under asymmetric information

题名	Security token offerings versus loan guarantees for risk-averse entrepreneurs under asymmetric information
作者	Liu，Xiang 1,2 ; Yang，Zhaojun2
通讯作者	Yang，Zhaojun
发表日期	2023-11-01
DOI	10.1016/j.frl.2023.104171
发表期刊	Finance Research Letters 影响因子和分区
ISSN	1544-6123
EISSN	1544-6131
卷号	57
摘要	We compare two competitive financing schemes, loan guarantees and security token offerings (STOs), for a risk-averse entrepreneur to start a project. We show that, if information is symmetric, STOs are better than loan guarantees. Under asymmetric information, we derive the highest equity price that makes low-type entrepreneurs’ imitation unprofitable. If the project risk is sufficiently high, loan guarantees (STOs) induce pooling (separating) equilibrium, and otherwise the opposite holds. Generally the higher the project risk, the less the share of equity retained by entrepreneurs and the less the project value. STOs might make project value increase with project risk. In the view of high-type entrepreneurs, if project risk is not very high or entrepreneurs do not dislike risk too much, loan guarantees are better than STOs, and otherwise the opposite holds true.
关键词	Information asymmetry Loan guarantees Signaling game STOs
相关链接	[Scopus记录]
收录类别	SSCI
语种	英语
学校署名	通讯
资助项目	National Natural Science Foundation of China[72031003];
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
WOS类目	Business, Finance
WOS记录号	WOS:001046766700001
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Scopus记录号	2-s2.0-85165350692
来源库	Scopus
引用统计	被引频次[WOS]：2
成果类型	期刊论文
条目标识符	http://sustech.caswiz.com/handle/2SGJ60CL/559517
专题	商学院_金融系
作者单位	1.China Academy of Financial Research,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou,310018,China 2.Department of Finance,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen,518055,China
第一作者单位	金融系
通讯作者单位	金融系
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Liu，Xiang,Yang，Zhaojun. Security token offerings versus loan guarantees for risk-averse entrepreneurs under asymmetric information[J]. Finance Research Letters,2023,57.
APA	Liu，Xiang,&Yang，Zhaojun.(2023).Security token offerings versus loan guarantees for risk-averse entrepreneurs under asymmetric information.Finance Research Letters,57.
MLA	Liu，Xiang,et al."Security token offerings versus loan guarantees for risk-averse entrepreneurs under asymmetric information".Finance Research Letters 57(2023).