疫情下救助预期与城投利差的分化

本文聚焦于新冠疫情背景下救助预期对城投债利差分化的影响。通过探讨中央政府救助预期如何在疫情冲击下影响城投债市场，本研究旨在揭示救助预期对城投债信用利差的影响。采用实证分析方法，基于2020至2022年间的数据，结合多元线性回归模型，以地方政府债务置换强度作为中央政府救助预期的代理变量，分析了救助预期与城投债信用利差之间的关系。研究发现，救助预期仅在疫情期间对城投债信用利差有显著影响，而在疫情前，救助预期的影响并不显著。此外，本文还对救助预期的影响进行了异质性分析，考察了不同经济条件和地区特征下的差异。研究结果为理解救助预期在城投债市场中的作用提供了新的视角。这些发现不仅为理解救助预期在不同经济环境和市场条件下的作用提供了深入见解，并为地方政府的债务管理和金融市场的稳定提供了政策建议。

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